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Abstrak
Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis berbagai perjanjian perdagangan bebas (FTA) yang telah
diikuti Indonesia selama 15 tahun terakhir dengan melihat tiga elemen utama diplomasi dagang,
yakni: aktor, proses, dan tujuan diplomasi. Berdasarkan kerangka ini, ditemukan bahwa kepentingan
politik luar negeri cenderung mendominasi dalam diplomasi dagang Indonesia dibandingkan
kepentingan ekonomi. Hal ini bisa dilihat dari tiga hal, yakni pertama, aktor diplomasi FTA Indonesia
cenderung didominasi oleh aktor negara, khususnya aktor politik luar negeri dengan partisipasi yang
sangat terbatas dari pelaku perdagangan dan aktor non-negara. Banyaknya FTA Indonesia yang
dilakukan melalui ASEAN juga cenderung memunculkan dominasi pemain politik luar negeri,
mengingat pembagian wewenang di ASEAN yang menempatkan pelaku politik luar negeri pada
hierarki yang lebih tinggi dibanding aktor perdagangan. Kedua, proses diplomasi FTA Indonesia
cenderung tidak efisien dan efektif karena melibatkan dualisme diplomasi melalui ASEAN dan
Indonesia, yang berkontribusi pada tumpang-tindihnya FTA dan menurunnya angka utilisasi dari
FTA. Ketiga, banyaknya FTA Indonesia yang berbasis ASEAN menyebabkan tujuan FTA bergeser
menjadi tujuan politik luar negeri dibandingkan ekonomi/dagang karena karakteristik ASEAN yang
lebih fokus ke isu politik dan keamanan. Berdasarkan temuan ini, perlu ada upaya reposisi dalam
diplomasi FTA Indonesia agar dapat menyeimbangkan tujuan perdagangan dan tujuan politik luar
negeri di dalamnya.

Kata kunci:
FTA, diplomasi, dagang, Indonesia

Abstract
The purpose of this article is to examine the various FTAs that Indonesia has been involved in within
the last 15 years by looking at the three core elements of trade diplomacy: actors, processes, and goals
of FTAs. Based on these elements, this research finds that Indonesia’s FTA diplomacy tends to be
dominated by foreign policy interests compared to economic ones, which can be observed through
several elements. First, Indonesia’s FTA diplomacy is dominated by state actors and foreign policy
players with little involvement from economic players and non-state actors. The numerous FTAs
signed through ASEAN also reinforced this domination since ASEAN’s distribution of authority placed
foreign policy players at a higher hierarchy than trade actors. Second, Indonesia’s FTA diplomacy
tends to be inefficient and ineffective due to dualism in its diplomatic process, which involves collective
negotiations through ASEAN and at the same time, individually through the national government. This
resulted in a multiplicity of agreements, leading to the low number of FTA utilisation by private
sectors. Third, Indonesia’s continued use of ASEAN as a medium for FTA negotiations leads to the
strengthening of foreign policy goals relative to economic ones, due to ASEAN’s internal
characteristics which focuses more on political-security relations, rather than economic ones. Based
on these observations, Indonesia needs to reposition its FTA diplomacy to find a better balance
between its foreign policy and trade goals.

Keywords:
FTA, trade, diplomacy, Indonesia
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INTRODUCTION
Until the mid-2020, Indonesia has been involved in several free trade agreements (FTAs)
with multiple partners, ranging from countries, groups of countries, and regional
organisations. According to a data from Asia Regional Integration Centre (ARIC)
(2020a), Indonesia is currently involved in 11 FTAs which are already in effect (entry
into force),1 4 FTAs which have been signed but not yet in effect, as well as undertaking
negotiations for 7 FTAs and engaging in 18 FTAs which are at the preparatory stage.2 In
total, Indonesia is currently involved in approximately 40 FTAs, positioning Indonesia as
one of the most actively involved Asian states in FTAs. In comparison, Malaysia is
involved in 34 FTAs, Thailand in 38 FTAs, Vietnam and the Philippines in 26 FTAs, and
Japan in 32 FTAs (Asia Regional Integration Center, 2020a). Thus, based on a purely
quantitative account, Indonesia’s FTA involvement only fell behind China (47 FTAs),
Singapore (43 FTAs), India (42 FTAs), and South Korea (41 FTAs), which emphasised
Indonesia’s active participation in FTAs. Within these FTAs, Indonesia’s involvement
can be classified into two categories: individual involvement, or FTAs directly initiated
by Indonesia itself, and collective involvement, in which Indonesia binds its FTAs
collectively through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Of the 40
Indonesian FTAs, 12 are finalised under ASEAN’s purview, where seven of these have
been signed and entered into force (Asia Regional Integration Center, 2020a).
In general, Indonesia’s active posture can be regarded as ‘normal’, considering
Indonesia’s position as one of the world’s most populated and largest consumer markets,
in addition to its export-oriented economy. Its enormous population allows Indonesia to
become an attractive partner for prospective FTA partners and often receives FTA
requests from external partners. The Indonesian government, as stated by the Ministry of
Trade (MoT), has also realised the importance of FTAs and other regional/multilateral
cooperation, which led to the incorporation of trade diplomacy as one of the working
agendas of the 2014-2019 Strategic Plan (Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia,
2015). In essence, Indonesia’s global trade activities are in line with the global trend,
where nowadays, countries advance their foreign policies based on economic activities
and conduct relations based on economic power (Gelb, 2010).
However, the potential benefits of these FTAs should be scrutinised, since the
high number of Indonesian FTAs does not necessarily correlate with its economic or
commercial benefit. For example, a study by Sitepu and Nurhidayat (2015) reported that
the preference utilisation rates (PUR) of Indonesian FTAs are rather low compared to
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other states, estimated to be somewhere between 6% to 35%. PUR represents the
percentage of actors from the business/private sector who have acquired the rights to use
and have utilised these FTAs (The Federation of German Industries, 2018), meaning that
these low rates indicate a highly underutilised trade instrument. Unfortunately, this
situation is exacerbated by the lack of comprehensive studies regarding Indonesia’s FTAs
and its trade diplomatic strategy. The majority of studies on Indonesian FTAs focus more
on the impact of a particular FTA for the economy or on a specific sector of the economy,
rather than on the overall benefits of these FTAs (see for example Setiawan, 2012, 2015;
Nasrudin et al., 2015; Ningsih et al., 2018). Moreover, studies on the political-economic
dimension of Indonesian FTAs are very limited and tend to be outdated (see, for example,
Soesastro & Basri, 2005; Chandra, 2005; Chandra, 2008). Although previous research on
Indonesian trade diplomacy at the multilateral, plurilateral, and unilateral levels exists
(see for example Pradana, 2013; Falahi, 2015; Ismail, 2019), studies on Indonesia’s
diplomacy through its FTAs remain scarce.
Taking this background into account, this article has two main objectives. First,
to analyse Indonesia’s FTA strategy and second, contribute to literature on the political
economic dimension of Indonesia’s FTAs and offer a conceptual framework that explains
trade diplomacy conducted by individual countries. This conceptual framework
comprises three main elements, namely actors, processes, and goals of trade diplomacy,
which are further categorised into several sub-elements. Based on the conceptual
framework and the collected data, this article argues that Indonesia’s FTA diplomacy
tends to be dominated by political factors and the need to fulfil foreign policy interests
rather than trade or commercial interests. Three main reasons support this argument. First,
Indonesia’s FTA diplomacy is dominated by state actors, particularly those closely related
to foreign policy-making and limits the participation of trade and non-state actors.
Second, decisionmaking and negotiation processes in Indonesian FTAs tends to be
inefficient and ineffective, as demonstrated by the overlaps between multiple FTAs, thus
lowering the PURs of these FTAs and further diminishing its economic usefulness. Third,
foreign policy interests tend to dominate Indonesia’s FTAs, particularly those initiated
through ASEAN, since, intrinsically, ASEAN gravitates more towards building external
political-security relations rather than economic ones. These three elements illustrate that
Indonesia’s FTA diplomacy tends to be biased towards foreign policy dimension relative
to economic or commercial dimensions.
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The findings in this research are supported by two types of data: documents
(newspapers, press releases, annual reports, databases, etc.) and interviews with key
informants from relevant Indonesian agencies and representatives from negotiating
partners and several ASEAN member-states. Secondary data on FTAs were retrieved
from ARIC database, managed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). This database
was chosen since ARIC provides the most detailed categories on the development phases
of FTA, compared to other databases, allowing for a more in-depth analysis. For instance,
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) database only categorised the development phases
of FTAs into two categories, the “in force” and “early announcement” phases. While such
classification may be useful for legal-institutional analysis, it does not provide many
insights into the political or non-legal aspects of FTAs. For example, FTA negotiation
between ASEAN and the European Union (EU) in 2007-2009 would not be included in
WTO’s database as it did not result in any legal document, although Indonesia was
involved in the process for two years. Therefore, such a database is not in line with this
article's purpose, which attempts to provide a comprehensive insight into Indonesia’s
FTA strategy.
In assessing the data, this article employs a thematic analysis through data
identification, data collation, and data reduction within the conceptual framework's
perimeter. To elaborate on the research's argument and findings, this article is divided
into four main sections. The first section discusses the literature on trade diplomacy and
introduces the conceptual framework. The second section explains the history and
development of Indonesia’s trade diplomacy since 2000, while the third section analyses
trade diplomacy using the conceptual framework. The last section concludes discussions
and provides recommendations for Indonesia to reposition its FTA diplomacy.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In practice, trade is one of the oldest forms of diplomacy, since classic diplomatic
practices tend to revolve around “war and trade” (Okano-Heijmans, 2012). International
merchants had always been diplomats (Tussie, 2013) and several early ‘trade
corporations’, such as the British East India Company and Dutch East India Company,
were essentially trade diplomats as they were given mandates by their respective countries
to be involved in trade negotiations (Lee & Hudson, 2004). However, the literature on
trade diplomacy seems to develop slower than other forms of diplomatic activities such
as security, territorial disputes, or military issues. Although the terminology “trade
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diplomacy” has been used since 1914 (Brown, 1914), it was not until the 1950s did the
term gained recognition, mostly due to the creation of a global trade regime following the
aftermath of World War II. Lee and Hudson (2004) identified two main reasons regarding
trade diplomacy’s minimal role within the literature on classis diplomacy. First, there
were dichotomies in International Relations (IR) which created divides between
‘international-domestic’, ‘political-economy’, and ‘public-private’, where the latter terms
(i.e. domestic, economy, and private) were perceived to be of lower status compared to
the former and unfortunately, trade diplomacy and economic activities tended to be
associated with the latter than the former. Second, IR studies tend to be state-centric, and
diplomacy was perceived as an effort to accommodate the anarchic nature of the
international structure and to create peace, while economic activities, including trade,
were perceived as less relevant to fulfil such functions. Therefore, trade diplomacy was,
historically, neglected within the studies of diplomacy, although these tendencies seem to
have evolved.
From the 1950s onward, more studies on modern-day trade diplomacy emerged,
particularly after the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
(GATT) in 1945 and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1993. This literature mostly
focused on the legal aspect and economic benefits of trade diplomacy (see for example
Hudec, 1975; Lipton & Bell, 1970), and tend to neglect the political economy or foreign
policy dimension of trade diplomacy. Trade diplomatic activities from this era were
perceived as collective efforts to manage global trade regimes and, thus, do not focus
much on individual states' specific strategy. By the end of 1990s and early 2000s, a new
group of literature on economic diplomacy emerged, in which trade diplomacy was
positioned as one of its most prominent strands. The main proponents of this study are
Coolsaet (2001, 2004), van Bergeijk and Moons (2011, 2018), Okano-Heijmans (2011,
2016), Woolcock (2012c), and Rana (2007, 2012), who mainly focused on states’
activities and political-economic strategies, as well as their impacts at the global level.
Within this literature, economic diplomacy can be understood as a foreign policy strategy
that rests upon the assumption that economic/commercial and political interests reinforce
each other and must be seen in tandem (Okano-Heijmans, 2011).
Throughout its development, scholars of economic diplomacy tend to debate three
core issues: who does it, which activities are included, and what goals are being pursued.
With regards to the actor, although most scholars agree that state actors mainly conduct
diplomacy, several scholars argue that economic diplomacy can also be done by non-state
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actors, noting that many recent activities within the global economy involve
representatives from the business sector and civil society groups (van Bergeijk & Moons,
2009, 2018). For instance, trade and economic negotiations would generally involve the
private sector and most–if not all–governments nowadays rely on business associations
to gather information in their policy-making process. On the other hand, other scholars
believe that non-state actors’ diplomatic activities are best described as ‘business
diplomacy’ or ‘corporate diplomacy’ since economic diplomacy is mostly a state-led
activity (Saner & Yiu, 2003). The second issue revolves around what activities are
regarded as economic diplomacy. The modern study of economic diplomacy comprises
several strands or clusters of activities, the most notable ones being trade diplomacy,
commercial diplomacy, and financial diplomacy. However, other scholars also suggested
to include other strands/clusters, such as consular activities, economic sanctions, foreign
economic incentives/aid, and even environmental issues (Lee & Hocking, 2010; Rana &
Chatterjee, 2011; Okano-Heijmans, 2011; Woolcock, 2012a). Out of these various
strands, three strands generally stood out the most, namely trade diplomacy, commercial
diplomacy, and foreign aid, since most countries nowadays build their economic
diplomacy strategy on these three pillars (Okano-Heijmans, 2016).
The third issue pertains to the goal of economic diplomacy, in which scholars are
divided on whether economic diplomacy should only pursue economic goals (Rana &
Chatterjee, 2011), foreign policy goals (Berridge & James, 2003), or both (OkanoHeijmans, 2016; van Bergeijk & Moons, 2018). In fairness, these scholars are generally
divided along their methodological and theoretical approaches which affected their
viewpoints. For example, scholars who lean towards the primacy of foreign policy are
mostly associated with studies on economic statecraft, focusing on economic sanctions
to influence other states’ behaviours. Economic statecraft can be defined as the use of
economic means to achieve interests in the international political arena, and while
seemingly alike to economic diplomacy, it is not identical to economic diplomacy since
economic diplomacy encompasses a broader array of issues (Baldwin, 1985). Meanwhile,
proponents of the primacy of economic purposes are associated with foreign economic
policy (FEP) studies, which look into states’ activities on production and distribution of
goods and services, as well as other cross-border economic activities which may influence
other states (Okamoto, 1997). In this sense, economic diplomacy is more comprehensive
and is more appropriately interpreted as a state’s strategy to achieve both political and
economic purposes. In other words, economic diplomacy is the intersection of foreign
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policy and economic policy. Thus, trade diplomacy can be understood as the nexus
between trade policy and foreign policy.
As a subset of economic diplomacy, analyses on trade diplomacy often employs
the same framework with economic diplomacy. However, due to its multiple strands,
different scholars often take different approaches in studying economic diplomacy. For
example, scholars focusing on commercial diplomacy, which scrutinises the effectiveness
of foreign representatives on export-import performances, tend to employ quantitative
approach (Yakop & van Bergeijk, 2011; Moons & van Bergeijk, 2017), while studies on
trade diplomacy mainly use qualitative approach (Woolcock, 2012a; Okano-Heijmans,
2014). The analytical and conceptual frameworks also vary, ranging from studies utilising
the management and business approach, (Naray, 2011; Zuidema & Ruel, 2012), the
negotiation approach (Bayne, 2012; Woolcock, 2012b), to an eclectic approach (OkanoHeijmans, 2011). Therefore, one main challenge for any research on trade diplomacy is
selecting and operationalising the research framework appropriately.
In line with this assertion, this article proposes three core elements to explain
Indonesia’s FTA diplomacy: actors, processes, and goals, which form the basic principles
of any economic diplomatic practices. Actor answers the who question in trade
diplomacy, while processes explain how such diplomatic practice is conducted, and,
lastly, goals explain the outcome being pursued through trade diplomacy. In looking at
the actor component, this research delves into state and non-state entities' role in
Indonesian trade diplomacy. Operationalisation of the process element is derived from
Bayne and Woolcock’s (2012) take on economic diplomacy, which encompasses two
main activities: decisionmaking and trade negotiation processes. As the third element, the
goal component is operationalised by looking at the two main goals of economic
diplomacy, which are economic/commercial and foreign policy goals. Figure 1 portrays
the conceptual framework of this research.
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Figure 1. Trade Diplomacy as a Conceptual Framework

Source: author’s own conceptualisation
This conceptual framework will be applied to understand Indonesia’s trade
diplomatic practice by elaborating its multiple FTAs.

DISCUSSION
The History and Development of Indonesia’s FTA Diplomacy
The first FTA which Indonesia engages in was the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
(AFTA), signed in 1992. Following this, Indonesia’s engagement was minimal until it
decided to sign the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) in 2004 (Asia Regional
Integration Center, 2020a). China’s political motives mostly fuelled ACFTA since China
seeks to minimise ASEAN member states’ fear of China’s economic ascendance in
Southeast Asia (Mursitama & Haura, 2011). Compared to Indonesia’s multilateral trade
diplomacy, which started in 1950 after Indonesia’s entry to WTO (World Trade
Organization, 2020), Indonesia’s FTA diplomacy is relatively young. However,
Indonesia’s FTA diplomacy tends to be more dynamic, as evidenced by the growing
number of Indonesia’s FTAs. One determining factor for this is the stagnation in
multilateral trade negotiations, where the Doha Round has been around for almost twenty
years with limited progress. Many countries, including Indonesia, then, shifted their trade
diplomacy towards bilateral/regional engagements, due to the fear of market loss and the
threat of economic rivalry. The WTO reported that there had been a significant increase
in the number of FTAs signed since 1995, where, currently, there are more than 600 FTAs
in place (World Trade Organization, 2019).
Following ACFTA in 2004, Indonesia proceeded to sign FTAs with 13 other
partners, the last one being with Chile and Mozambique in August 2019 (Asia Regional
Integration Center, 2020a). In general, there are two kinds of FTAs which Indonesia signs,
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the individual FTAs which Indonesia signs on its own and the collective ones which
Indonesia signs under the ASEAN framework. Of the ten FTAs already signed and
entered into force, six were signed under the ASEAN framework, while Indonesia signed
the rest on its own (Asia Regional Integration Center, 2020a). Meanwhile, out of the eight
FTAs currently being negotiated, one is collectively negotiated via ASEAN, and the rest
is done independently by Indonesia. Table 1 provides a list of Indonesia’s concluded
FTAs from 2004 to mid-2020.
Table 1. Indonesia’s Involvements in FTA Negotiations which has been Concluded (2004-2020)
No.

Name of the FTA

1.

ASEAN-China Free Trade
Agreement
ASEAN-Korea Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation
Agreement
Indonesia-Japan Economic
Partnership Agreement
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive
Economic Partnership
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand
Free Trade Area
ASEAN-India Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation
Agreement
Preferential Tariff Arrangements
– Group of 8 Developing
Countries

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

Signed in
(Year)
2004

Partner(s)
ASEAN, China

2007

ASEAN, South Korea

2008

Japan

2008

ASEAN, Japan

2010

ASEAN, Australia,
New Zealand
ASEAN, India

2010

2011

Bangladesh, Egypt,
Iran, Malaysia,
Nigeria, Pakistan,
Turkey
Pakistan

Indonesia-Pakistan Free Trade
Agreement
Trade Preferential System of the
Organization of the Islamic
Conference

2013

10.

Indonesia-EFTA Free Trade
Agreement

2018

11.

Indonesia-Australia
2019
Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement
ASEAN-Hongkong Free Trade
2019
Hong Kong
Agreement
Indonesia-Chile Free Trade
2019
Chile
Agreement
Indonesia-Mozambique Free
2019
Mozambique
Trade Agreement
Source: Asia Regional Integration Center (2020a)

9.

12.
13.
14.

2014

Members of the
Organisation of
Islamic Cooperation
(OIC)3
Liechtenstein,
Iceland, Norway,
Switzerland
Australia

The FTA’s Status
Signed, and in
effect
Signed, and in
effect
Signed, and in
effect
Signed, and in
effect
Signed, and in
effect
Signed, and in
effect
Signed, and in
effect

Signed, and in
effect
Signed, but not yet
in effect

Signed, but not yet
in effect
Signed, but not yet
in effect
Signed, and in
effect
Signed, and in
effect
Signed, but not yet
in effect

Aside from the FTAs already finalised, Indonesia is currently undertaking negotiations
with multiple partners, as listed in Table 2.
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Table 2. Indonesia’s Involvements in FTAs Which are Under Negotiation/Waiting to be Signed
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Name of the FTA

Started in
(Year)
2011

Partner(s)

Indonesia-India Comprehensive
India
Economic Cooperation Arrangement
Indonesia-Republic of Korea Free
2012
South Korea
Trade Agreement4
Regional Comprehensive Economic
2013
ASEAN, China, Japan, South
Partnership5
Korea, Australia, New Zealand
Indonesia-EU Comprehensive
2016
27 member states of the EU
Economic Partnership Agreement
Indonesia-Turkey Free Trade
2017
Turkey
Agreement
Indonesia-Tunisia Preferential Trade
2018
Tunisia
Agreement
Indonesia-Morocco Preferential Trade
2019
Morocco
Agreement
Source: Asia Regional Integration Center (2020a)

It is also important to note that trade negotiations usually occur in multiple phases, and
even after being signed, many FTAs will still require further negotiations to discuss
additional details or revitalise previously expired FTAs.
Analysing the number of Indonesia’s completed FTAs until mid-2020, Indonesia
is most active through the ASEAN framework, which accounts for six out of ten active
agreements. Moreover, several FTAs also overlap, where these FTAs involve similar
partners but is made through both individual and collective channels (e.g., FTAs with
Japan, Australia, India, and South Korea). In fairness, overlaps in FTA negotiations are
done not only by Indonesia but also by other ASEAN member states. Currently, all
ASEAN member states, except Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, have at least one
additional (individual) FTA in place with similar ASEAN dialogue partners in addition
to the ASEAN-led FTA (Asia Regional Integration Center, 2020a).
In terms of the process, there are several differences between the individual and
ASEAN-led FTAs. For individual negotiations, Indonesia’s negotiation team is led by an
official from the Indonesian MoT, while for ASEAN-based negotiations, the negotiating
team is led by a senior trade official from one ASEAN member state. This position is
usually assumed by a representative from the ‘country coordinator’6, agreed collectively
during the initial stage of the negotiation process (Author’s Personal Interview, 2018).
This lead negotiator and his/her staff are responsible for managing the negotiation process
and consolidating the positions of ASEAN member states.
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In conducting its external economic relations, the ‘ASEAN-minus-X’ mechanism
may be applied, where ‘X’ refers to the number of ASEAN member states who may wish
to defer its commitment to the agreement. This mechanism is encapsulated in the Article
21 paragraph 2 of the ASEAN Charter, which states that “In the implementation of
economic commitments, a formula for flexible participation, including the ASEAN
Minus X formula, may be applied where there is a consensus to do so” (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, 2007). This rule was applied in 2006 when Thailand refused to
join the ASEAN-Korea FTA due to South Korea’s rejection of rice to be included in the
exclusion list (Associated Press, 2007). Thailand joined three years later after undertaking
additional negotiations with South Korea (Bangkok Post, 2008). During the RCEP
negotiations, the Philippines also suggested utilising the ASEAN-minus-X principle to
fast-track the negotiation process (Pillas, 2017), although the suggestion was not followed
through. Obviously, this mechanism does not exist in Indonesia’s individual trade
negotiations.
Another notable difference is in the choices of FTA partners and the
decisionmaking procedures between the individual and ASEAN-led FTAs. For individual
negotiations, Indonesia can independently respond or initiate offers to engage with
external partners, while ASEAN-led FTAs will require unanimous agreement from all
member states. ASEAN, however, tends to be highly selective in choosing its FTA
partners since until now, ASEAN’s FTA partners only consist of countries which are
officially regarded as ASEAN’s dialogue partners,7 namely Australia, Canada, China,
EU, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States.8 Other nondialogue partners who are interested in conducting FTA negotiations with ASEAN would
be suggested to ‘first build closer relations with ASEAN’ before commencing such
negotiations (Author’s Personal Interview, 2018). However, the possibility of building a
closer relationship and becoming ASEAN’s dialogue-partner (and eventually, ASEAN’s
FTA partners) is rather slim considering that since 1999, ASEAN had imposed a
moratorium on adding dialogue partners (Thuzar, 2017; Haacke & Breen, 2018). This
phenomenon indicates that ASEAN is relatively political in choosing its FTA partners,
which may differ from Indonesia’s economic calculations when undertaking individual
FTA negotiations.
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Indonesian FTA Diplomacy: Analysis of Actors, Processes, and Goals
Referring to the conceptual framework presented above, the analysis on Indonesian FTA
diplomacy practices will focus on three main components: who are involved (the actors),
how is it conducted (the processes), and for what goals. In general, trade diplomacy
involves two types of actors, the state actors and the non-state actors. However, state
actors cannot be deemed as unitary, since they typically consist of multiple government
institutions, focusing on different policy areas and thus, will cater to diverse interests. The
same goes for non-state actors, who are often not monolithic or coherent and are usually
divided into two main groups, the private sectors and civil society groups.
Actors in Indonesia’s FTA Diplomacy
For Indonesia, the MoT is legally mandated as the main coordinator of trade diplomacy,
as they are responsible for coordinating and managing the decisionmaking process and
negotiations. Article 86 of the Law No. 7/2014 on Trade states that first, in conducting
international trade agreements, the government may form a negotiating team responsible
for preparing and undertaking trade negotiations. Second, details regarding the formation
of the negotiation team will be stipulated further in the Presidential Decree No. 82/2017
on the Negotiating Team for International Trade Agreements (Perundingan Perdagangan
Internasional, hereinafter referred to as PPI). Article 5 of the decree further specified that
the Minister of Trade acts as the head of the PPI team while 21 other ministers, head of
national bodies and relevant institutions act as members. Furthermore, Article 6 Section
2 and 3 of the Decree declares that first, the head of the PPI team acts as the coordinator
and person-in-charge for all trade negotiations, and second, a directorate-general will
assist the PPI Team within the MoT in charge of international trade negotiations.
According to these regulations, trade diplomacy legally falls under the purview of
MoT. In practice, however, several other factors are also at play. First, to sign and finalise
trade agreements, MoT requires a letter of authority from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MoFA), as regulated in Article 14 of the Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Affairs. Second,
despite MoT’s role as the coordinator of trade diplomacy, MoFA may still influence the
choice of FTA partners through political deals, especially for FTAs negotiated under the
ASEAN framework. This is due to the decisionmaking structure within ASEAN, which
is unidirectional, and the MoT is positioned at a lower level compared to MoFA. Within
the ASEAN structure, MoFA is a member of the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC),
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while MoT is positioned under the ASEAN Economic Community Council (AECC).
Figure 2 describes how such structure plays out in ASEAN.

Figure 2. Decision-Making Structure in ASEAN
Source: adopted from Feraru (2015)

Within the decisionmaking structure of ASEAN, the MoFA (through ACC) holds
the ‘instruction’ mandate, enabling it to provide decisions or guidance, while the MoT
(through AECC) is only granted with a ‘reporting’ mandate. Although the ASEAN
Summit, which facilitates meetings between heads of states, holds the highest authority,
ACC essentially plays a more prominent role since the actual consensus and
decisionmaking processes occur at this level. The ASEAN Summit only functions as a
forum that legitimises the decisions achieved at ACC and other ministerial meetings and
is more of a ceremonial nuance. Formally, to initiate FTA negotiations with ASEAN, the
prospective dialogue partner must submit a ‘Letter of Intent’, followed by a feasibility
study involving both parties. In practice, feasibility study is a mere ‘formality’, as the
study will always generate positive outcomes for both parties (Author’s Personal
Interview, 2018).
Furthermore, it will be politically challenging for Indonesia (or other ASEAN
members) to reject requests for FTA negotiations from its dialogue partners, considering
175

Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian

their past political relations.9 This situation implies that, from the perspective of the MoT,
it will be harder to turn down FTA offers if they originate from ASEAN’s dialogue
partners due to their strategic role. However, this does not suggest that ASEAN is not
concerned about commercial/economic factors in considering FTA offers,10 but rather
that political consideration plays a dominant role in ASEAN-led FTAs. In other words,
for ASEAN-based FTAs, MoFA plays a significant role in determining the FTA partners
and considering that more than half of Indonesia’s active FTAs are finalised through
ASEAN, MoFA certainly holds a dominant place in Indonesia’s FTA diplomacy.
MoFA’s dominance in trade diplomacy is further strengthened by Indonesia’s
shifting strategy in diplomacy, where economic diplomacy is positioned as one of its main
diplomatic pillars. Under Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) leadership, economic diplomacy holds
a central position in Indonesian diplomacy and, in fact, during his second term, there is a
tendency to divide the trade diplomatic authority between MoFA and MoT, where MoFA
is expected to handle the diplomatic side and MoT is tasked with handling the technical
issues (Yuniartha, 2019). This shift was followed by the appointment of a new Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mahendra Siregar, an expert in trade issues and has
previously worked for the MoT (Dewi, 2019), indicating Indonesia’s effort to build
synergy between the economic and political functions of Indonesian diplomacy. Before
this, the government also studied the possibility of merging MoFA and MoT (Setiawan,
2019) or handing over the responsibility of conducting international trade agreements to
MoFA (Hadyan, 2019), although none of these scenarios was actualised. What can be
observed then, is that the growing inclusion of economic issues in Indonesia’s foreign
policy agenda also paves the way for an increasingly prominent role of foreign policy
players in the overall Indonesian trade diplomacy.
Contrary to foreign policy players' ascending role in Indonesia’s trade diplomacy,
non-state actors' role in trade diplomacy remains highly limited. Although the Presidential
Decree No. 82/2017 specifies that the Head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(Kamar Dagang dan Industri or KADIN) is also a member of the PPI team, this is not
always the case in the actual practice. Interviews with representatives from the private
sectors reveal that their involvement in the PPI team is rather minimal and are only
involved on an ad hoc basis, rather than long-term involvement. This involvement also
relies on two core factors, who the negotiating partner is and who the lead negotiator is
(Author’s Personal Interview, 2018). Several FTA partners, such as Australia and the EU,
will request involvement from the private sectors during negotiations, enabling these
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business entities to monitor the negotiation progress. However, if no such request is made,
the private sectors are rarely involved. For instance, during the ASEAN-Hong Kong FTA
negotiation in 2017, the private sectors were only invited towards the end of the process,
when they were asked to deliver their opinions with no further follow-up by the
government (Author’s Personal Interview, 2018). In addition, the personal background
and current workload of the lead negotiator are also important, since they correlate with
the ability to mobilise the necessary resources and maintain strategic relationship and
communication with the private sector. From previous experience, negotiators with trade
background and less workload were more likely to involve private sectors than
negotiators with non-trade background and/or more workload (Author’s Personal
Interview, 2018). This is perhaps because negotiators with trade-related backgrounds are
more likely to have staff with a high level of technical expertise in trade and maintain a
better relationship with the private sectors.
Akin to the private sector, involvement from the civil society groups in
Indonesia’s trade diplomacy is also limited, as there is no formal mechanism for their
involvement. Legally, civil society’s involvement in trade negotiations can only be done
through their representatives in the Indonesian House of Representatives (Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR), as stipulated in Article 83, 84, and 85 of the Law No. 7/2014.
Aside from this, civil societies do not have any legal basis to justify their direct
involvement in trade negotiations, leading to their exclusion in most trade negotiations
(Author’s Personal Interview, 2018). There are, indeed, exceptions in several cases, most
notably during the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) and RCEP
negotiations when, the negotiating partners request civil society’s involvement (Author’s
Personal Interview, 2018). Another situation when civil society groups are more likely to
be involved is during the negotiations of a large-scale FTAs or FTAs that carry massive
impacts–such as the RCEP–which causes the general public to be more aware of these
FTAs and thus, can lead to stronger demands by the civil societies to be included in the
negotiations (Author’s Personal Interview, 2018).
Processes in Indonesia’s FTA Diplomacy
In addition to the actor component, Indonesia’s trade diplomacy processes also need to
be taken into account, particularly on two core issues. First, the likelihood of negotiation
inefficiencies since two decisionmaking models are present: the individual and collective
decisionmaking model through ASEAN. Second, the ineffectiveness of Indonesia’s
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FTAs, particularly those initiated through ASEAN, since trade negotiation through
ASEAN create additional complexities due to the multiple interests that needs to overlap.
Effectiveness in this sense is defined as the fulfilment of economic purposes through
FTAs and is measured by the FTA utilisation rate, which calculates the percentage of the
private sector, which utilises these trade preferences.
Generally, FTA negotiations through ASEAN enables Indonesia to have stronger
bargaining power since, collectively, Indonesia and other ASEAN member states can
offer larger market size and more economic benefits, compared to individual negotiations.
ASEAN-based FTAs also offer larger scope for ‘rules of origin (RoO)’ and ‘regional
value content (RVC)’, compared to national-level FTAs, providing additional benefits for
Indonesian exporters (Author’s Personal Interview, 2018). From the perspective of
negotiating partners, collective negotiations through ASEAN are also more beneficial
since it enables them to formulate trade agreements with multiple countries by engaging
with a (supposedly) single party (Author’s Personal Interview, 2018). However, ASEAN
negotiations also have downsides, such as the added complexity of consolidating multiple
positions and eliminating several national interests.
For national-level FTAs, the decisionmaking process is simpler despite several
challenges as well. Generally, FTA starts with a letter of intent from prospective partner,
followed by a feasibility study, and commencing the negotiation. Once agreements are
reached, these agreements will be sent to the legislative body for ratification purposes,
and, lastly, implement the trade agreement. Throughout these processes, the main
challenge is to consolidate the different positions of technical ministries, particularly
regarding protectionism or liberalism for specific goods/services (Author’s Personal
Interview, 2018). At the ASEAN level, the consolidation process is more difficult since
ASEAN requires a regional common position first, before commencing negotiations with
external partners; thus, adding another layer of complexity to the negotiation process. As
a result, the content of ASEAN FTAs tends to be simpler (or shallower) compared to
national-level FTAs since member states often face difficulties in consolidating their
often-divergent positions. For example, during the interview, a negotiator from ASEAN’s
external partner points that during the negotiation, although several ASEAN member
states have agreed on the inclusion of government procurement in the agreement, several
members reject this, and thus, the whole agreement is cancelled (Author’s Personal
Interview, 2018). As a result, several ASEAN members, including Indonesia, decided to
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undertake additional negotiations with similar partner(s) to accommodate issues which
were not covered in ASEAN-based FTAs.
As portrayed in Table 1 and 2, Indonesia currently has or is negotiating several
FTAs with similar partners as ASEAN’s, which shows these overlapping tendencies.
Looking at the content of these FTAs, individual FTAs obviously can offer a higher
degree of commitment and a larger scope of cooperation (albeit smaller market size) since
only one national interest is at play. However, the main problem with being involved in
two FTAs with similar partner(s) is that it creates inefficiencies in negotiations. Referring
to Table 1 and 2, Indonesia was involved in 21 FTAs within the last 15 years, where ten
are conducted with similar partners. This is in addition to other overlapping agreements
currently being explored such as the ASEAN-EU FTA (complementing the IndonesiaEU CEPA) and the ASEAN-Pakistan FTA (complementing the Indonesia-Pakistan FTA).
Specifically, for Japan, Indonesia even signed its individual and ASEAN-based FTAs
within the same year (2008), emphasising the inefficiencies in Indonesia’s FTA
diplomacy. On average, Indonesia is involved in one to two FTA negotiations per year
and explores one to two possible FTAs per year since 2004 (Asia Regional Integration
Center, 2020a). If ten (or a quarter) of these FTAs are arranged with similar partners, then
obviously these negotiations' inefficiencies are quite high.
Aside from its efficiencies, the effectiveness of these FTAs also tends to decline
when multiple FTAs overlap since private sectors only need to utilise one of these
agreements. In general, an FTA's effectiveness can be measured by looking at the PUR
or the percentage of businesses who are eligible and have utilised these FTAs relative to
those who are eligible but did not utilise these FTAs (The Federation of German
Industries, 2018). The PUR can be calculated using two methods, the national-level
method by looking at the export/import form and the business level by distributing
surveys to check which FTAs businesses use (Ing, Urata, & Fukunaga, 2015).
Unfortunately, until now, Indonesia does not have (or publish) any comprehensive data
on PUR. However, one interviewee from the MoT suggests that the average PURs in
Indonesia ranges from 20% to 30% (Author’s Personal Interview, 2018), which are still
low compared to other countries. For instance, the average PUR in Singapore is 68%,
meaning that more than half of its private actors have utilised Singapore’s existing FTAs
(Lim & Choo, 2015). Upon further scrutiny, Indonesia’s PUR is even lower for ASEANbased FTAs, since they offer less trade preferences.

179

Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian

Ing, et al. (2015) found that the utilisation rate for ASEAN-Japan FTA stood at
only 6.6%, although Japan is one of ASEAN member states’ main trading partners.
Meanwhile, the highest utilisation rate for ASEAN-based FTA is ACFTA, at 32.7%. This
is perhaps, not a coincidence considering Japan has the most FTAs with individual
ASEAN member states while China has the least FTAs. What can be inferred then is that
private sectors tend to use national-level FTAs as substitutes rather than complementary
to ASEAN-level FTAs. It can be concluded, then, that overlapping FTAs lead to
inefficiencies in negotiations and ineffectiveness in its utilisation.
Goals in Indonesia’s FTA Diplomacy
The third element pertains to the goals of trade diplomacy, which can be classified into
two types, the commercial/economic goals and foreign policy goals. Essentially, trade
diplomacy is mostly expected to serve economic goals, although, in practice, all countries
are likely also to accomplish non-economic purposes through its trading activities. For
instance, Indonesia-China Strategic Partnership–which also encompasses trade
cooperation–is one of Indonesia’s diplomatic instruments utilised to influence China’s
acceptance of Indonesia’s vision on international order (Priyandita, 2019). Within the
context of FTAs, Indonesia’s individual FTAs are more inclined to serve economic
purposes compared to ASEAN-based FTAs due to several reasons. First, individual FTAs
can offer a wider scope and a higher level of trade commitments than ASEAN-based
FTAs, which is essentially more beneficial for economic actors. Second, ASEAN is
historically more driven by external political-security considerations rather than
economic ones and henceforth, its external relations, including in trade, will mainly
revolve around political/foreign policy purposes as well.
Initially, ASEAN was established to maintain regional stability in Southeast Asia
amidst the Cold War and its ideological divide. As ASEAN develops, it has started to
incorporate economic cooperation and other issues, although political-security still holds
a central role in ASEAN’s overall affairs (Koga, 2014; Narine, 2008). The centrality of
political security is also apparent in ASEAN’s external relations where external economic
relations are given less priority compared to external political or security relations. For
example, within the ASEAN Secretariat organisational structure, the External Economic
Relations Division, which is responsible for ASEAN’s external trade relations, is
positioned under the Market Integration Directorate, as a part of the ASEAN Economic
Community Department. However, this division only has five personnel, including the
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head of the division.11 Meanwhile, within the ASEAN Political-Security Community
Department, a separate directorate for external relations is present, which is divided into
three main divisions, or approximately three times the resources of the external economic
relations division.
The primacy of political and security issues is also evident in ASEAN member
states’ FTA practices, where countries opt for additional FTAs through ASEAN with a
similar partner, despite already having concluded individual FTAs or other trade
preferential arrangements which, economically, provide greater benefits. For instance, in
ASEAN’s FTA diplomacy with the EU, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar is unlikely to
gain additional economic benefits since the EU has administered a unilateral trade
preferences under the ‘Everything but Arms (EBA)’ Scheme (European Commission,
2018). Similarly, Singapore and Vietnam have also signed individual FTAs with the EU,
with presumably, a higher level of trade preferences than what ASEAN can offer and yet,
still decided to continue FTA negotiations via ASEAN. In an interview with
representatives from these states, this decision was justified given the reasoning that they
need to express their solidarity with fellow ASEAN member states, as ASEAN is their
most important foreign policy circle (Author’s Personal Interview, 2018). Furthermore,
the interviewee pointed out that ASEAN-based FTAs should not be interpreted only as
an economic instrument, but also a ‘political signal’ to other states on ASEAN’s solidarity
and unity (Author’s Personal Interview, 2018). Within this context, foreign policy goals
are clearly more prominent in ASEAN-based FTAs, compared to individual FTAs.
Noting that most of Indonesia’s active FTAs are finalised through ASEAN (six
out of ten FTAs), the economic ineffectiveness of these FTAs–as the previous section has
illustrated–may also be a result of the strong foreign policy goals being at play. The
existence of foreign policy goals is, indeed, justifiable, and in fact ASEAN have, perhaps,
succeeded at this front. For example, RCEP is by far, the first platform that managed to
bring together ASEAN’s six dialogue partners–several of which are great regional powers
– under one forum where ASEAN acts as the ‘manager’. In fact, ASEAN has a habit of
using these types of forums to maintain its central role and safeguard Southeast Asia’s
regional cohesiveness (Ba, 1997). However, while these goals are reasonable, the need to
obtain foreign policy objectives should not undermine the economic goals, especially for
Indonesia.
The problem with Indonesia is that since its trade diplomacy is characterised by a
low level of involvement by private sectors and inefficiencies in negotiations, the
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economic advantages of these FTAs may diminish overtime since these FTAs fail to
acknowledge what private sectors and economic players need. As a comparison,
Singapore actively involves its private sectors in FTA negotiations through questionnaires
and regular updates of FTA negotiations (Author’s Personal Interview, 2018). Therefore,
although ASEAN-based FTAs will mostly fulfil the foreign policy goals, Singapore’s
individual diplomacy will always be aligned with the private sector’s needs–as evidenced
by the high PUR–and, thus, fulfilling their economic goals. Unfortunately, such efforts
have yet to be seen in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION
Trade diplomacy, as the nexus between foreign policy and trade policy, will
fundamentally consist of both economic and political dimensions. For Indonesia, this
research reveals a bias towards the foreign policy dimension of trade diplomacy,
compared to the economic ones as evidenced by three main aspects. Looking at the actors
involved, Indonesia’s FTA diplomacy is rather centralistic and is dominated by
stakeholders in foreign policy-making with little involvement by non-state actors. In
terms of the processes, Indonesia’s trade diplomacy is characterised by a dualistic
approach, where Indonesia engages in FTAs both individually and collectively through
ASEAN, leading to inefficiencies in negotiation and the ineffectiveness of these FTAs.
This ineffectiveness can be seen by the low FTA utilisation rates, particularly those
initiated through ASEAN. Lastly, Indonesia’s FTA diplomatic goals lean more towards
achieving foreign policy goals, rather than economic ones, as exemplified by the number
of FTAs signed and the economic benefits that they bring. ASEAN’s emphasis on
political-security goals also resulted in the primacy of foreign policy objectives in
Indonesia’s trade diplomacy, relative to economic ones.
Looking at these findings, Indonesia needs to reposition its FTA diplomacy to
achieve larger economic goals. In doing so, Indonesia may opt for several possible
courses of actions. First, Indonesia needs to incorporate private sectors and civil society
groups to better connect with the public’s need in its FTA negotiations. Indonesia can
look at the EU’s ‘Civil Society Dialogue’ model, where the EU provides a regular forum
for different stakeholders to allow regular updates on FTA negotiations. This will, of
course, rely heavily on the PPI team's workload, meaning that Indonesia also needs to
comprehensively assess its ongoing FTA negotiations to ensure that the resources are
distributed effectively and efficiently. Second, Indonesia needs to maximise ASEAN’s
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external economic relations division's role and function and focus more on the
formulation and attainment of regional collective trade goals. Indonesia may explore the
possibilities of creating an ad hoc team to design and formulate a template ASEAN FTA
to reduce inefficiencies in negotiation. Along a similar line, ASEAN can also maximise
the use of addendums in their FTA negotiations to provide leeway for member states who
wish to engage in deeper commitments with external ASEAN partners.
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Note:
1

These eleven FTAs include the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA).

2

There are several stages in the formation of an FTA: the ‘proposed/under study’ phase, in which initial planning and
joint study are conducted; the ‘under negotiation’ phase; the ‘signed but not yet in effect’ phase, which indicates that
the FTA has been signed but still needs to be ratified; and the ‘signed and in effect’ phase, meaning that the FTA has
been fully implemented or entered into force (Asia Regional Integration Center, 2020b). Signing an FTA can also
mean two things. First, countries sign the framework of agreement, which serves as a reference for further
negotiations and second, countries sign the documents for the whole agreement simultaneously.
3

Members of OIC include Bahrain, Bangladesh, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Guinea, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia,
Maldives, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Syria, Cameroon, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, GuineaBissau, Iraq, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, Palestine, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.
4

Indonesia and South Korea have concluded the negotiation process in October 2019 and is waiting for the final
signing process, which is planned to be held in 2020.
5

At the time of writing, RCEP had not been signed.

6

Country coordinator (CC) refers to ASEAN’s external relations management system, in which each ASEAN
member state is mandated with the responsibility to become a coordinator for certain dialogue partners within the
duration of three years. For example, Indonesia is currently the country coordinator for Russia in 2018-2021, and will
serve as the country coordinator for the United States in 2021-2024 (ASEAN Secretariat, n.d.).
7

In managing its external relations, ASEAN categorised its partners into different levels/categories, which include
dialogue partners (the highest level), followed by sectoral dialogue partners and development partners.
8

Legally, this prerequisite is not stated in any ASEAN legal documents, but in practice, all of ASEAN’s FTA
partners is also its dialogue partner.
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9

In practice, ASEAN have delayed or halted negotiation processes with two dialogue partners: Canada and EU. For
Canada, ASEAN suggested a slight delay since it needed to focus on RCEP negotiations and lack the resources to
continue negotiation with Canada. For the EU, the EU itself suggested halting the negotiation process (2007-2009)
but in 2016, the EU and ASEAN decided to reopen the negotiation (Author’s Personal Interview, 2018).
10

The existence of commercial/economic considerations in ASEAN FTAs is still evident by looking at its choices of
FTA partners, who are predominantly ASEAN’s (and Indonesia’s) largest trading partners. However, the utilisation
rates of these FTAs are rather low and hence, their limited commercial benefits.
11

This number was recorded in 2018, when the interviews for this research were conducted. Upon follow-up, the
current number of staff is seven personnel and is projected to increase to a maximum of 14 personnel.
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